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The following article extends the scope of the Church-State problem
beyond the parochial school issue.

CHURCH-STATE
RELATIONS IN WELFARE*
RIGHT REVEREND MONSIGNOR GEORGE H.

AMID THE VARIED,

GUILFOYLE, LL.M.t

vibrant aspects of the mission of the Church is Her

charitable apostolate. The mission given the Church by Her Divine
Founder is to bring God to man and man to God - the total man, composite of body and soul. The works of mercy, established and practiced
within the Church throughout the centuries, are not merely worthy
humanitarian projects. They are among the credentials of the Church of
Christ. In the hierarchy of values the supernatural is greater than the
natural, the spiritual greater than the material. But that is by no means to
say that the natural and the material in man are not important or that
they do not count in God's plan. The total man is soul and body, spiritual
and material - it is that total man whose happiness is to be sought,
whose salvation is to be won. Obviously in helping man the Christian
mission has to take into account the whole man even though the primacy
lies with the spiritual aspects of his nature. There is a Christian humanism - it is the only true humanism.
And so, necessarily from the nature of things as well as from precept,
the Church of Christ must be concerned with the welfare needs of man,
and, indeed, not only concerned, but active about them. At the same
time, within its charge the State has the duty to provide for the material
and temporal welfare of its.people through the promotion of the common
good and by cooperative activity. Inevitably, then, we face questions of
the relationships of Church and State in the field of welfare.
* An address delivered at the Catholic University School of Law on February 13,
1957.
t Priest of the Archdiocese of New York; Executive Director of Archdiocesan Catholic Charities.
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The Church and State are each concerned
with the well-being of the human race. In
Immortale Dei Pope Leo XIII stated:
God has divided the government of the
human race between two powers, the ecclesiastical and the civil; the one being set over
the Divine, the other over human beings.
Each is supreme in its own sphere; each has
fixed limits within which it moves. Each is
circumscribed by its own orbit, within
which it lives and works in its own natural
right.'
In Church and State, therefore, we have
two perfect societies with their proper
spheres. The Church's end is man's spiritual welfare; that of the State, his material
well-being. Though distinct and complementary, we find in them an area of overlap.
This area of overlap is the thorny one in
delimiting the proper spheres of each.
Today much is said and written on the
subject of Church-State relations from the
civil law point of view. Many, perhaps, do
not realize that in addition to the broad,
intricate discussion of this subject in the
field of legal philosophy and constitutional
theory, there is among theologians a parallel discussion of the moral principles applicable to the relationships of these two
societies. Lawyers and future lawyers should
find particular interest in the theological
discussion of Church-State relations and in
the fervor and skill with which protagonists
of the traditional view, among whom Father
Francis J. Connell of the Catholic University of America is a leader, vie with Father
John Courtney Murray, S.J., and others
defending a modern liberal view.
Suffice it to say here that the theologians
have a great deal to offer the lawyers and
that lawyers should be interested in and
'Encyclical

(1885).

Letter of Leo XIII, Immortale Dei

active in their own communities and areas
of influence, and in the development of
sound legal principles on this vital question.
In an address delivered at Fordham University on October 15, 1955, Father Murray
observed:
I do not myself believe that any solid
bridge of legal doctrine has yet been built
to a right decision - both legislative and
judicial - on the vexing problem of reconciling the legal demands of separation of
church and state with the rightful social and
religious demands of a people that confesses
itself to be religious and that also knows its
socio-religious structure to be pluralist and
tripartite. There is here a task for the legal
profession, to be performed not only, or
even mainly, in the courtroom, but also, and
particularly, in the larger forum of public
opinion
Background
Our discussion will center, not on the
theology of the matter, but rather on the
American law and practice involved in the
Church-State question in respect to the
welfare activities of religious organizations.
The pivotal statement of civil law on the
whole Church-State question in the United
States is the First Amendment to the Constitution, which reads in part:
Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the

free exercise thereof....
Related is Section 1 of the Fourteenth
Amendment which reads:
No State shall make or enforce any law
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor
shall any State deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process
of law; nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
2

Murray, Freedom, Responsibility, and the Law,

2
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214, 222 (1956).
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A review of the decisions reported indicates that during the last decade there has
been more interest in the matter of ChurchState relations and more contests under
these sections and related state constitutional provisions than during the sum of all
the prior years.
We have had no federal establishment of
religion although history records many
evidences in this country not only of religious bigotry but of religious preference.
In fact, nine of the original thirteen states
had established churches, and some continued them even after the establishment of
a federal govenment. In addition, in several
states there were legal discriminations
based on religion, e.g., against Catholics
for many years (in New Hampshire as late
as 1876 despite the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868).
Nevertheless, since the establishment of
the nation we have had for the most part
mutually cooperative relations. The tax
exemption accorded all charitable organizations, chaplains for various public undertakings, payments of public monies for
services rendered by sectarian charitable
organizations, have been some of the generally accepted relations between Church
and State. It is beyond our scope to review
the federal and state cases on these matters,
but several recent key cases must be mentioned. These bear on the problem for the
future with regard to the Church-State
question in welfare. They are the comparatively recent Supreme Court decisions in
Everson v. Board of Education,3 Illinois
ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Education,4
Zorach v. Clauson,5 and most recently,
8330 U. S. 1 (1947).

4333 U. S. 203 (1948).
343 U. S.306 (1952).
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Heisey v. County of Alameda.6
Actually, we find that the term, "Separation of Church and State," has various
meanings and has been applied differently
in different areas of public policy, education, welfare and the military. The separation is most apparent and far reaching in
education. Most state constitutions prohibit
not only direct, but indirect aid to sectarian
educational institutions. Private religious
schools have been, traditionally, fully supported by the personal sacrifice of the members of the religious bodies.
The Everson decision sustained the constitutionality of a New Jersey statute which
provided for transportation of children to
and from parochial schools. The McCollum
decision struck down as unconstitutional an
Illinois program of "released time" from
public school for religious instruction within
the public school building.
These decisions promulgated an extreme
view of this absolute separation in the
field of education. Justice Black, speaking
for the majority of the Court in the Everson
case, wrote:
Neither (a State nor the Federal Government) can pass laws which aid one religion,
aid all religions, or prefer one religion over
another.'
and further on
No tax in any amount, large or small,
can be levied to support any religious activities or institutions, whatever they may be
called, or whatever form they may adopt
to teach or practice religion.
The theory followed in the McCollum
case, developed in the first instance by Jus'352 U. S. 921 (1956).
' 330 U.S. at 15.
' Id. at 16.
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tice Black and lengthily supported by Justice Rutledge in his dissenting opinion in

the Everson case, is that the clause "law
respecting an establishment of religion,"
supplemented by the Fourteenth Amendment, forbids both the national government and the states "to pass laws which aid
one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one
religion over another."
This represents an extreme and, in my
judgment, an unsound view. Some would
extend this doctrine to other fields and
thereby disrupt historical practices. After.
all, the bus transportation for school pupils
involved and supported in the Everson case,
while of tremendous importance to the individual citizen, pales in significance in respect to what is involved compared, for instance, with the tax exemption enjoyed by
churches and their activities, and the system of purchasing support of dependent

children from religiously operated institutions.
In connection with the Everson and McCollum decisions and this whole ChurchState problem, of prime importance is the
decision of the United States Supreme
Court in Zorach v. Clauson. In the McCollum case, the Illinois released time program was outlawed. In the Zorach case,
decided four years later, the New York
State released time program was upheld.
Speaking for the majority, Justice Douglas
had some notable observations. He said,
inter alia:
The First Amendment, however, does not
say that in every and all respects there shall
be a separation of Church and State. Rather,
it studiously defines the manner, the specific ways, in which there shall be no concert or union or dependency one on the
other. That is the common sense of the
matter. Otherwise the state and religion

would be aliens to each other suspicious, and even unfriendly

hostile,

We are a religious people whose institutions presuppose a Supreme Being. We
guarantee the freedom to worship as one
chooses ....
When the state encourages religious instruction or cooperates with religious authorities by adjusting the schedule
of public events to sectarian needs, it follows the best of our traditions. . . . But we
find no constitutional requirement which
makes it necessary for government to be
hostile to religion and to throw its weight
against efforts to widen the effective scope
of religious influence.1
We cannot read into the Bill of Rights
such a philosophy of hostility to religion."
Heisey v. County of Alameda presents another reason for encouragement. This case
originated in California where it was known
as Lundberg v. County of Alemeda. 12 The
Supreme Court of California upheld the
right of tax exemption of educational organizations and religious organizations. In
this case plaintiff, a citizen and taxpayer
of the county, brought suit to challenge the
constitutionality of a portion of Section 214
of the California Revenue and Taxation
Code which grants tax exemption to
property "used exclusively for school purposes of less than collegiate grade and
owned and operated by religious, hospital
or charitable funds, foundations or corporations." The exemption was added in 1951
and approved by public referendum. This
appeal to the Supreme Court of California
was from a judgment declaring it invalid.
9343 U. S. 306, 312.

'Old. at 313-14.

" Id. at 315.
"46 Cal. 2d 644, 298 P. 2d 1, dismissed on appeal
sub nom. Heisey v. County of Alameda, 352 U. S.
921 (1956).
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The California Constitution, Article XIII,

§ 1c, provides that in addition to such exexemptions as provided in the constitution,
the legislature may exempt from taxation
property used exclusively for religious, hospital or charitable purposes and owned by
chests, funds, foundations or corporations
organized and operated for religious, hospital or charitable purposes and not for
profit.
The court said that the validity of the
statutory exemption involved in this case
depended first on whether an educational
purpose may be regarded as a charitable
purpose within this article. The court went
into this at length and said:
It thus appears that the word charitable
has been given a broad construction in tax
exemption cases as well as others, and it
would seem clear that nonprofit schools
owned by nonprofit organizations and operated for the benefit of the public come within
the term charitable as defined by our decisions.'
The court also discussed the legislative
history of the section of the Constitution
in question with the same result, namely the
inclusion of educational purposes within
the term charitable.
The court considered the argument that
the exemption, as applied to schools owned
by religious organizations, violated Article
IV, §30, of the state constitution which
provides that the legislature shall not grant
aid to any religion, sectarian purpose, sectarian school, college, etc. The court said
this did not mention tax exemption and, in
any case, was superseded by subsequent
adoption of Article XIII, §11/2 which exempted property used for religious worship
and of §lc "which, as we have seen,
authorizes exemption of nonprofit schools
Id., 298 P. 2d at 5.

CATHOLIC

LAWYER,

APRIL,

1957

and specifically refers to property owned
14
and operated by religious organizations.
The court then took up the argument
that the exemption contravenes the First
Amendment and dismissed it. It said, "Under the circumstances, any benefit received
by religious denominations is merely incidental to the achievement of a public purpose."15
The California court also said that even
if we regard tax exemption as benefiting
religious organizations, it does not follow
that it violates the First Amendment.
The principle of separation of church and
state is not impaired by granting.tax exemptions to religious groups generally, and it
seems clear that the First Amendment was
not intended to prohibit such exemptions.
Accordingly, an exemption of property used
for educational purposes may validly be applied to school property owned and operated by religious organizations."6
In the United States Supreme Court
where the case was known as Heisey v.
County of Alameda, the appeal was dismissed for want of a substantial federal
question. Mr. Justice Black and Mr. Justice Frankfurter dissented, and the Chief
Justice did not participate.
It has been succinctly stated that:
• ..[T]he militant secularists have scored
three major victories in their campaign to
keep religion within the four walls of the
church building. Two of these victories were
...the Everson and McCollum cases....
The third secularist victory is perhaps the
greatest. Through clever propaganda secularists have duped many people into thinking these decisions were warranted. They
have shelved the actual wording of the First
16

Id., 298 P. 2d at 7.

"Ibid.
16Id., 298 P. 2d at 8.
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Amendment, ignored its history, and substituted their favorite metaphor, "the wall of
separation between Church and State."'"
Certainly the perversion of Jefferson's
"wall of separation" was so effectively done
that for many it has become, in its distorted
meaning, a by-word. For that reason the
decision and observations of the majority
in the Zorach case and the result in the
Heisey case must have been a breath of
fresh air to all those who believe that
neither principle nor the Constitution require government and religion to be hostile
and uncooperative. I s
Some have expressed the view that the
Church-State problem is being overplayed
in *this country at the present time. If this
be so, why is it so? That question invites
some interesting theories. It is factually
evident, however, that certain organized
groups view with horror not only the provision by government of even welfare services to a child in a parochial school but
any practical recognition by government of
religion in any welfare services to young
or old.
In my judgment, the Everson decision
was right in conclusion but wrong in much
of its reasoning. Neither constitutional history nor legal theory justify the wall of
absolute separation. Moreover, I think that
the Supreme Court today, presented with
the same facts as in the Everson and McCollum cases, might be expected to reach
the same conclusions but not with the same
argumentation. A lot has happened in the
courts and outside in the ten years since
the Everson decision. And yet, we can not
17KEEFE, AMERICAN SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND
STATE 9-11

(1951).

"For a discussion of this subject by an advocate
of this point of view, see O'NEILL, RELIGION AND
EDUCATION UNDER THE CONSTITUTION

(1949).

be certain what the future has in store.
Hopefully, the attitude of Church and State
in the areas of overlap will be one of mutual
friendliness and cooperation.
New Philosophies in Welfare
"Separation of Church and State" has
had a different application in welfare than
in education. Many complex factors, largely
related to history, necessarily enter any
analysis -of the causes of this difference as
it has developed in the thinking of the public, legislators and judges. One fundamental
difference between education and welfare
in this country is the fact that we have built
a large and powerful system of schools, at
all levels of education, under the control of
government. In welfare we do not have any
comparable network of direct public services although we do have tremendous programs of public assistance.
By and large, throughout the country it
is the voluntary agency, the voluntary hospital, the voluntary child care institution
to which the public has looked in the past
and still looks for most direct charitable
services. These strong voluntary agencies
represent the traditionally accepted way of
providing such needed services. They are
respected, they have status in the community.
Discernible in the last decade, however,
is a growing opposition, small, perhaps, but
vociferous, to this traditional role and to
the acceptance which voluntary welfare
agencies have enjoyed under our way of
life. The reasons for this trend may be
divided, for purposes of discussion, into
three. They are: (1) the assumption of an
increasing and often necessary role by the
State in the area of social welfare; (2) an
unreasoned fear in some quarters of any
aid by government to religion, even when

3
the aid is basically to individual citizens
and the religious agency through which it is
channeled is performing a common good;
(3) the development of secularism.
Expanding Welfare Role of
Government
The development of public welfare services has received its greatest impetus since
the end of World War II. With a prolonged
period of economic prosperity and huge
tax funds at its command, the State has
been able to initiate and further on a large
scale welfare programs which voluntary
agencies could never hope to undertake.
The development of Social Security and
public assistance, for instance, could not
have reached present levels if public monies
had not been plentiful. Public monies for
combating juvenile delinquency and for
various types of rehabilitation are other
examples of heretofore unheard of activity
by government. Certainly this increasing
acceptance by government of responsibility
for social welfare has been necessary and
to its credit.
We find, however, that the architects of
these vast programs of social legislation,
dedicated as they may be, are often officials
who have not been closely allied, nor even'
in some cases familiar, with the role and
values of voluntary welfare agencies. Many
either are not acquainted with, or do not
recognize, the soundness of what is termed
the "principle of subsidiarity," and which
has been so forcefully outlined on occasion
by Pope Pius XII. The principle of subsidiarity should be fundamental in welfare
as elsewhere. It is a norm for regulating
and gauging the proper order of responsibility and the discharge of the obligations
of justice and charity - both personal and
governmental, local, state and federal - in
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relation to human needs and their alleviation. In accord with this principle a sound
community welfare program would utilize
first voluntary effort, and should that be
insufficient, then governmental effort, local,
state and federal, in that order. For the
closer the relationship, the greater the
responsibility.
Parallel with the principle of subsidiarity,
a second criterion for the evaluation of new
public welfare programs is that of partnership. The joinder of forces-between voluntary and public agencies, each independent
but contributing within its competence and
supplying what the other lacks, provides
the ideal democratic program of welfare.
Such a partnership exists, for instance,
where government does not duplicate what
voluntary agencies provide, but rather purchases the services of voluntary agencies, if
persons who are government charges are
involved. Principal among such services are
. the care of the sick and the care of homeless children in institutions or boarding
homes.
The changes in our population and economy often require large scale programs with
huge operating expenditures which can only
be met by public funds. But, the service
itself, the immediate care-of the child, the
individual counseling, the vocational guidance, the nursing care, can be rendered
more humanely and with greater deference
to the individuality and dignity of the
human being by the voluntary charitable
agency. Moreover, it can usually be rendered more economically and efficiently by
the voluntary agency and this is especially
true where the voluntary institution has the
benefit of the donated services of religious.
The Secretary of Health, Education and
Welfare, Marion B. Folsom, on December
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6, 1956, in an address before the National
Press Club expressed with force and clarity
the ideal division of function between government and voluntary agencies, a division
which aptly applied the concepts of both
subsidiarity and partnership. He said in part:
..[W]e say the Federal Government would
fail to serve the people's interest if it stood
idly by, indifferent to broad deficiencies in
health, education or economic security deficiencies which might undermine our national progress and well-being. We believe
that when the welfare of the whole people
is involved in certain problems which are
nationwide in scope - problems which cannot be solved, or solved quickly enough, by
private efforts or local and State governments - then there is a deep Federal responsibility to help. We believe the Federal
Government, no less than local or State
governments, is an instrument of the people. It can and should act in these fields for
the benefit of all the people.
When Federal concern leads to Federal
action, however, we believe the most helpful often is not to take over the whole
show. Instead, Federal activities often should
be designed to encourage greater initiative
and enterprise by individuals, private agencies, and local and State governments. This
method has two great advantages. First, it
combines a wider range of resources against
a problem - human resources of experience
and ingenuity, as well as financial resources.
And, second, it frequently has the advantage
of applying these resources through the people and channels closest to the problem,
where knowledge and judgment of local
conditions can be invaluable.
Thus, we seek a pattern of cooperative
action by private enterprise and by local,
State, and Federal governments - a sharing
and division of responsibility designed to
foster the best combination of services for all
the people. The Federal role is one of leadership and assistance, but not domination.
The Federal government supports local and
private effort, but does not supplant it....

The fact remains, however, that increasing costs combined with the increase of
available public monies, the development
of greater social welfare consciousness combined with a public welfare philosophy
among certain community leaders and professional personnel in public agencies, make
one wonder whether voluntary and especially religious welfare activities can continue to live and to grow. If not, certainly
something of great moment would be lost.
Surely it is important to be clear in our
own minds and also articulate with regard
to the fundamentals of good welfare.

Fear of Encroachment
The second element is the fear of the
encroachment of religion in government.
The statements and actions of the organization known as "Protestants and Others
United for the Separation of Church and
State" indicate this fear. The political philosophy of this organization, and persons
of similar persuasion, has been, of course,
most apparent in the area of Church-State
relations in education. But, it has distinct
overtones in welfare. 19

Secularism
The third element, secularism, is not necessarily related in causation and motive to
the second, mentioned above, but its ob'.For instance, in October 1951, the Senate was
called upon to clear appropriations under the HillBurton Act to two voluntary hospitals, one Methodist and the other Catholic, in the District of
Columbia. "Protestants and Others United" registered sharp disapproval of the grants before the
Senate District of Columbia Comnittee. Their disapproval was based on the Church-State issue and
the First Amendment to the Constitution. The
Committee and the Senate rejected this argument
but the significance is that arguments of this nature, comparatively new in the welfare field, are
now being made.

3
jectives are essentially the same - the
complete separation of government and
religion, including church welfare activities.
The secularist may be driven by conviction
rather than fear. Indeed, he is often noted
for the intensity of his convictions. Secularists vigorously deplore any form of contract between government and religious
agencies, even governmental purchase of
services for value received. Many carry
their activities to such lengths that they can
justly be considered hostile to religion even
if their formal opposition is limited in words
to opposition to anything hinting of religion
in public life. Of course, secularism is a
form of the materialism which is perhaps
the greatest plague of our day.
In 1952, in a statement of the Catholic
Bishops of the United States which spoke
of the threat of secularism, it was said:
These words of Lincoln not only recall
to us our national traditions relative to the
importance of religion; they also remind
us of the constant temptation for this Country to turn away from God and to become

immersed in material pursuits.
In our own day wide spread yielding to
this temptation has given rise to an even
greater danger - the way of life we call
Secularism.
Those who follow this way of life distort
and blot out our religious traditions, and
seek to remove all influence of religion from
public life. Their main efforts are centered
on the divorce of religion from education.
Their strategy seems to be: first to secularize completely the public school and then
to claim for it a total monopoly of education.'

The views of the secularist are greatly
different from those of the Church. From
the beginning the Church has recognized
°The Tablet, Nov. 22, 1952, p. 8, col. 2.
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that her duty to the needy involves practical
service. Very early, charity in practice became to a degree organized and systematized. The few were delegated to serve the
needy in the name of the many.
The objective then was the same as now
- the alleviation of human misery in order
to help the total man work out his eternal
salvation. If sectarian welfare organizations
are to fulfill this praiseworthy objective,
they must be recognized and respected by
government as well as the community. If
they perform a welfare service for the community, for the public good, it is hardly
conceivable that they would not be in.
some
kind of partnership with governmental
agencies. Yet, the secularist would take
man apart if not completely strip him of his
spiritual dignity, and he would insist that
what deals with man's spiritual concerns
must be isolated from his "non-spiritual"
concerns.
In His Christmas Message of 1952, Pope
Pius XII beautifully expressed the concepts
basic to this question when he said:
It is superstition to expect salvation from
rigid formulas mathematically applied to the
social order, for this way of thinking attributes to them an almost'prodigious power
which they cannot have ....21

Elsewhere in the same Message, the Holy
Father wrote:
Whoever, therefore, would furnish assistance to the needs of individuals and peoples cannot rely upon security as an impersonal system of men and matter, no matter
how vigorously developed in its technical
aspects.
Every plan or program must be inspired
by the principle that man as subject, guaidian and promoter of human values, is
2tThe Tablet, Jan. 3, 1953, p. 8, col. 6.
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more important than mere things, is more
important than practical applications of scientific progress, and that above all it is imperative to preserve from an unwholesome
"depersonalization" the essential forms of
the social order which We have just mentioned, and to use them to create and develop human relationships.'
Criteria
Attorneys interested in preserving intact
the tradition of personal, meaningful service to the needy as discharged by religious
and other voluntary agencies, and legislators and judges with the same conviction
may find the following questions useful in
the evaluation of legislation and the assessment of court constructions:
(1) Is it predicated on the principle of
subsidiarity?
(2) If public monies for services are
involved, does it reflect the principle of
partnership?
(3) Does it promote the notions of human dignity and personal service?
(4) If it relates to children and minors,
does it preserve the fundamental rights and
duties of parents and the rights of the child?
These questions are pertinent in the
evaluation of all programs touching ChurchState relations in welfare. If the program is
traditional, the answers likely will be in the
affirmative. If the program is a new one, the
answers may or may not be in the affirmative, at least in the beginning stages of legislation. It is interesting to note, that many
new welfare programs when first suggested
contain highly controversial features, but
somehow or other before enactment the
democratic process usually asserts itself and
right principles prevail. Whether or not this
will continue depends in no small measure
on the lawyers of the future.
Ibid.

Specific Problems
Until recent years welfare concerns have
been primarily state matters rather than
federal. It may be interesting now to turn
to some specific examples under the laws
of New York. It is necessary here to select
some areas and to omit others. One of those
omitted, the increasing problems accompanying zoning laws, could alone be the
subject of important study. Another important topic omitted is that of taxation. True
enough there is generally exemption from
taxes for religious as for all charitable agencies but there are notable exceptions, e.g.
certain excise taxes, some special district
assessments, etc.
Public Monies
.In the State of New York we have one of
the finest patterns of welfare legislation in
the country, a pattern in which religion and
religious agencies receive a respect and
recognition unknown in some parts of the
country. We have, moreover, a large pattern
of services under religious auspices. These
programs are protected by constitutional
and statutory provisions. And yet, at the
same time it is also interesting to note that
in New York we have a concentration of
much of the efforts directed against governmental relations of any kind with religious
groups and religious welfare programs.
Article XI, §4, of the New York State
Constitution provides:
Neither the state nor any subdivision
thereof shall use its property or credit or any
public money, or authorize or permit either
to be used, directly or indirectly, in aid or
maintenance, other than for examination or
inspection, of any school or institution of
learning wholly or in part under the control
or direction of any religious denomination,
or in which any denominational tenet or doc-

3
trine is taught, but the legislature may provide for the transportation of children to
and from any school or institution of learning.
Under this section, its history and interpretation, there can be no question regarding
the policy of the State toward State supported schools. Such education must be
non-partisan and non-sectarian. 23 Public
monies may not be used, directly or indirectly, to aid any school in which a denominational tenet is taught. But, what has been
the effect on welfare institutions that provide care and maintenance, including education of the dependent child?
* Article VII, §8, and Article VIII,
§1, of
the New York Constitution control the use
of State and local monies respectively for
private purposes. Both prohibit the gift or
loan of public monies to private undertakings. But, both sections contain an exception of vital significance to welfare agencies.
The exception language of Article VIII,
§1, regarding local monies, is set forth
below. This provision is similar though not
identical to Article VII, §8. The same reasoning applies though the problem more
frequently arises in connection with local
monies.
Subject to the limitations on indebtedness
and taxation applying to any county, city or
town, nothing in this constitution contained
shall prevent a county, city or town from
making such provision for the aid, care and
support of the.needy as may be authorized
by law, nor prevent any such county, city
or town from providing for the care, support, maintenance and secular education of
inmates of orphan asylums, homes for dependent children or correctional institutions
and of children placed in family homes by
'Judd v. Board of Education, 278 N.Y. 200 15
N.E. 2d 576 (1938).
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authorized agencies, whether under public
or private control, or from providing health
and welfare services for all children. Payments by counties, cities or towns to charitable, eleemosynary, correctional and reformatory institutions and agencies, wholly
or partly under private control, for care,
support and maintenance, may be authorized, but shall not be required, by the legis-:
lature.
These exceptions provide the constitutional authority for the excellent partnership of public and private agencies existing
in New York State. Under their sanction it
is permissible, for instance, for the state
and local government to contribute financially to the support of children needing
institutional or foster home care by purchase of service, while at the same time the
warm personal service and individual care
and training are provided by voluntary
groups including religious agencies. Indeed
the language would seem sufficiently broad
and inclusive to extend similar partnerships
as circumstances may require to a variety
of social services such as family counseling
to needy persons, day care centers for the
24
aging, and the like.
One interesting and key aspect of the
program was settled in Sargent v. Board of
Education.25 The court held that though
St. Mary's Boys' Orphan Asylum of Rochester provided for its children secular education in addition to ordinary care, the
Home should not be barred from public
funds under former Article IX, §4, which
prohibited the payment of monies to denominational schools. The court recognized
that the instruction of the Asylum's population was neither practicable nor possible
See People ex rel. N.Y. Inst. for Blind v. Fitch,
154 N.Y. 14, 47 N.E. 983 (1897); Shepherd's
Fold v. City of New York, 96 N.Y. 137 (1884).
177 N.Y. 317, 69 N.E. 722 (1904).
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elsewhere than in the institution and held
that St. Mary's Orphanage was neither a
school nor an institution of learning within
the meaning of the Constitution, but on the
contrary was an orphan asylum within §14
of former Article VIII permitting payment
of public monies.
This is a far cry from the wall of absolute
separation that some would erect despite
the traditions and practices to the contrary
throughout the country.
A recent important opinion in another
jurisdiction is that of the Supreme Court
of Pennsylvania in Schade v. Allegheny
County Institution District.26 An unfavorable decision in this case could have been
a damaging blow to the cause of religious
welfare organizations. The issue was basically a Church-State issue involving the
role and function of religious welfare agencies in the community. The court decided
unanimously in favor of the defendant.
The section of the Pennsylvania Constitution under review, Article III, §18, reads:
No appropriations, except for pensions or
gratuities for military services, shall be made
for charitable, educational or benevolent
purposes, to any person or community, nor
to any denominational or sectarian institution, corporation or association.
The court said that payments to sectarian
institutions for the care of children were not
appropriations within the meaning of that
term as employed in Article III, §18. In
the court's quotation from the concurring
opinion below, we find this significant distinction which may check the trend that
separationists and secularists have been
encouraging:

neither a charity nor a benevolence, but a
governmental duty. All the plaintiffs proved
was that the monies received by the defendant institutions were in partial reimbursement for the cost of room and board of such
minors....

The Constitution does not prohibit the
State or any of its agencies from doing business with denominational or sectarian institutions, nor from paying just debts to them
when incurred at its direction or with its
approval.'
The court also averted briefly to appellant's argument that the payments violated
the Fourteenth Amendment by tending
toward the "establishment of religion." It
rejected this contention summarily, noting
that it was settled in Everson v. Board of
Education where it was held that the states'
use of public funds for transportation of
pupils did not promote the establishment
of religion.
Somewhat allied questions have been involved in the various state tests of the
Hill-Burton grants to voluntary hospitals,
including hospitals under religious auspices.
The Hill-Burton Act- recognizes the fact
that most American hospitals, though privately controlled, are semi-public charitable
institutions contributing to the common
good. 28 While there have been no federal
decisions, there have been a few significant
state challenges.
An early leading case on this general
subject is Bradfield v. Roberts.29 This involved a suit brought by a taxpayer to
enjoin the Commissioners of the District
id. 126 A.2d at 914.
68 Stat. 4611(1954), 42 U.S.C. §291 (v) (Supp.

The cost of the maintenance of neglected
children either by the State or the County is

III, 1956), amending Hospital Survey and Construction Act of 1946, 60 Stat. 1040, 42 U.S.C.
§291 (1952).

386 Pa, 507, 126 A.2d 911 (1956).

-175 U.S. 291 (1899).
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of Columbia from making a contract with
Providence Hospital under which they
would use funds appropriated by Congress
to erect a building on the hospital grounds.
Upon completion of the building it would
be turned over to the hospital, which agreed
that two-thirds of its capacity would be
reserved for poor patients assigned by the
Commissioners. The Providence Hospital
was incorporated by an Act of Congress.
The plaintiff maintained that the hospital
corporation was composed of religious of
the Roman Catholic Church and conducted
under the auspices of the Roman Catholic
Church. He argued that the corporation
was a religious or sectarian body and that
the proposed step violated the Constitution.
In rejecting the plaintiff's contentions,
the Supreme Court said:
The facts above stated do not in the least
change the legal character of the hospital, or
make a religious corporation out of a purely
secular one as constituted by the law of its
being. Whether the individuals who compose
the corporation under its charter happen to
be all Roman Catholics, or all Methodists,
or Presbyterians, or Unitarians, or members
of any other religious organizations, or of no
organization at all, is of not the slightest consequence with reference to the law of its
incorporation, nor can the individual beliefs
upon religious matters of the various incorporators be inquired into. Nor is it
material that the hospital may be conducted
under the auspices of the Roman Catholic
Church. To be conducted under the auspices.
is to be conducted under the influence or
patronage of that Church. The meaning of
the allegation is that the church exercises
great and perhaps controlling influence
over the management of the hospital. It
must, however, be managed pursuant to the
law of its being. That the influence of any
particular church may be powerful over the
members of a non-sectarian and secular
corporation, incorporated for a certain de-
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fined purpose and with clearly stated powers,
is surely not sufficient to convert such a
corporation into a religious or sectarian
body. That fact does not alter the legal
character of the corporation, which is incorporated under an act of Congress, and
its powers, duties and character are to be
solely measured by the charter under which
it alone has any legal existence. There is no
allegation that its hospital work is confined
to members of that church or that in its
management the hospital has been conducted so as to violate its charter in the
smallest degree. It is simply the case of a
secular corporation being managed by people who hold to the doctrines of the Roman
Catholic Church, but who nevertheless are
managing the corporation according to the
law under which it exists. The charter itself
does not limit the exercise of its corporate
powers to the members of any particular
religious denomination, but on the contrary
those powers are to be exercised in favor
of any one seeking the ministrations of that
kind of an institution.'
In conclusion, the Supreme Court stated:
The act of Congress, however, shows there
is nothing sectarian in the corporation, and
"the specific and limited object of its creation" is the opening and keeping a hospital
in the city of Washington for the care of
such sick and invalid persons as may place
themselves under the treatment and care of
the corporation. To make the agreement was
within the discretion of the Commissioners,
and was a fair exercise thereof."
In 1949 the Kentucky Court of Appeals

in Kentucky Bldg. Comm'n v. Effron held
that grants to Episcopalian and Catholic
hospitals did not violate the Federal or
State Constitution. The court said:
[A] private agency may be utilized as the
pipeline through which a public expenditure
is made, the test being not who receives the
'Id. at 298-99.
Id. at 299-300.
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money but the character of the use for

which it is expended.
The fact that members of the'governing
boards of these hospitals, which perform a
recognized public service to all people regardless of faith or creed, are all of one religious faith does not signify that the money
allotted the hospitals is to aid their particular denomination.w
Another welfare situation, arising under
the New York constitutional provisions,
concerns the payment of public monies to
day care centers serving the children of
working mothers. Under New York law,
there has been no formal implication that
payment of such public monies to voluntary agencies was other than a needed and
proper governmental expenditure; nor has
there been serious question of the propriety
of such monies going to day care centers
conducted under religious auspices.
But in New York the payment of monies
to day care centers conducted by religious
agencies on parochial school premises has
been seriously challenged. Since day care
centers must be accessible to the community, the use of parochial school facilities
is often a vital necessity for these programs.
However, on May 12, 1943 the Attorney
General of New York held that the maintenance of a child care project in a religious
school building, even though outside school
hours, would be a direct violation of Article
XI, §4 of the State Constitution.33 This, he
held, was true whether the programs were
conducted by religious authorities, private
social agencies or public authorities.
The defect was judged to be not that the.
program was conducted by a religious
agency, nor that it was conducted on prop310 Ky. 355, 220 S.W. 2d 836, 837-38 (1949).
N.Y. ATT'Y GEN. REP. FOR 1943 at 118-19.

erty owned by a religious corporation. The
defect was that the program was conducted
in a school building in which a denominational tenet was taught. The day care center
was held to be an indirect aid to the parochial school.
Multiple problems might have followed
such reasoning, if the opinion had not been
distinguished and revised. After extended
study and conference the situation was materially improved by a further opinion of
the Attorney General which held that the
use of the non-instructional facilities of
denominational schools by publicly supported youth projects could not be held, as
a matter of law, to foster and encourage the
34
educational functions of such schools.
Under this revised opinion the State Youth
Commission and the New York City Youth
Board have been able to help set up many
worthwhile projects utilizing the services of
voluntary agencies. Many of these projects
are of a recreational nature and are conducted in the gymnasium or recreation
rooms of parochial schools.
Religious Protection Clauses
Still another and more important phase
of Church-State relations in welfare is that
of the religious protection of minors. Customarily the term "religious protection
clauses" is used to embrace those constitutional and statutory provisions which require generally that when a minor is placed
for adoption or committed for foster care
to an institution or private home, such
minor, whenever practicable, must be
placed in an institution or home under the
control of persons of the same religious
faith. In New York State this welfare practice has constitutional sanction.
3,N.Y. ATT'Y GEN. REP. FOR 1950 at 210-12.
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Article VI, §18, of the New York Constitution authorizes the legislature to establish Children's Courts. It provides further:
In conferring such jurisdiction the legisla-

ture shall provide that whenever a child is
committed to an institution or is placed in
the custody of any person by parole, placing
out, adoption, or guardianship, it shall be so
committed or placed, when practicable, to

an institution governed by persons, or in
the custody of a person, of the same religious
persuasion as the child.
Conforming New York statutory requirements are found in the Social Welfare
Law,3" the Domestic Relations Court Act, 36

the Children's Court Act, 37 and other
statutes.
These are realistic and practical clauses.
Certainly they testify by implication to religious differences among citizens in our
pluralistic society and to the existence of
institutions and homes of different faiths.
They reflect, moreover, the considered
judgment of the community as expressed

by its legislators. They are tangible evidence
of the importance and esteem accorded the
place of religion in the lives of all. Further,
these clauses are intended as an expression
and application, appropriate to the circumstances, of the parent's natural and legal.
right to determine the religious training of

the child.
In instances where a court or public wel-

fare department is required to commit or
make other disposition of a child away from
his parents, the state - that is such court or
public welfare department - stands in .loco
parentis, with all that such relationship
implies. In matters of this nature, affecting
the lives of minors, the state exercises much
'N.Y.

SOC. WELFARE LAW

,N.Y.C. DOM.

1 N.Y.

§373.
§88.

REL. CT. ACT

CHILDREN'S CT. ACT §26.
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more than a purely ministerial function. It
necessarily takes to itself, for the good of
the individual and society, the discharge of
a supremely delicate and personal function.
In the discharge of that function the "best
welfare" of the child takes precedence. This
has clearly been held by the'courts in a
variety of fact situations bearing on the
custody of children. What is less clear, however, are the factors that comprise "best
welfare" and who shall be the ultimate
arbiter of this.
Speaking for the citizens of their respective states, the New York Legislature and
42 other State Legislatures as well, have by
statute answered these questions in part.
One state, New York, has a constitutional
provision requiring consideration to be
given to the religious affiliation of the
persons involved. Twenty-one states have
statutes requiring some consideration of
religious faith in adoption proceedings.
Thirty-three states have statutes with religious provisions relating to commitment or
placement of dependent children in private
institutions or foster homes. Thirty-six
states have provisions relating to commitment or placement of neglected children in
private institutions or foster homes. Thirtysix states have statutory religious provisions
relating to commitment or placement of
delinquent children in private institutions
or foster homes.351 Through these clauses
they have indicated that they judge religious
considerations to be a component of "best
welfare." They also have considered it not
sufficient to provide only for formal relig.ious training. But recognizing that the for" See

ST. THOMAS MORE INSTITUTE FOR LEGAL RESEARCH, SURVEY OF LAWS RELATING TO RELIGIOUS
CONSIDERATIONS IN THE ADOPTION AND PLACEMENT OF CHILDREN I-I (St. John's Univ. School
of Law, 1956) (unpublished mimeograph report).
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mation of a child along religious lines is a
continuous overall process that must permeate the entire way of life, they have
thought it wise to require that, whenever
practicable, the child should be cared for in
the home of persons of the same religious
faith. It is to be noted that this is not an
arbitrary or capricious requirement. It is
to be applied only ."when practicable" thus
leaving a reasonable and proper area for
the discretion of the court.
It is difficult to recognize how in good
faith there can be disagreement with the
philosophy, aspiration and law of this procedure. There is patently no establishment
of religion, nor aid to religion. There is
fidelity to a trust established in line with
the convictions of the majority. Nevertheless, some secularistic minded persons and
groups have embarked on a campaign in
derogation of these principles. A multiplicity of reasons have been advanced depending on which phase of the clause is
being attacked and the forum that is
utilized.
Usually, however, the arguments of opponents of the religious protection clauses
take the following general lines:

The characterization is entirely unwarranted.
The court or public welfare agency does no
more than protect the religious faith of a
child deprived of parental care. Actually,
although the State has an ample area of
discretion through the use of the phrase
"when practicable," the mandatory aspect
of the language of the clause actually serves
as a guide to the court or welfare department in assessing the relative importance
of religion in welfare. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts in construing
the words "when practicable" in a Massachusetts statute said:
The difference is that, whereas before the
new statute there was no definite rule binding upon the judge in any set of circumstances as to how much weight was to be
given to anyone of the several elements as
against the others, he is now bound to give
controlling effect to identity of religious
faith "when practicable," but not otherwise.'
3) They reflect a proprietary interest on
the part of the Church in children who are
wards of the State. Actually, they reflect
the rights of parents and the duty of the
State to bring about conditions that will
promote the temporal well-being and happiness of man.

1,) The religious protection clauses emphasize religion to the detriment of welfare
in the care of children. This argument overlooks the traditionally accepted concept
that religion is a basic component of "best
welfare," and is not to be regarded merely
as an additional consideration. If the situation were as opponents of these clauses
prefer, the approval of religion as an element of welfare would be largely governed
by the predilections of the particular justice
or public welfare official.

4) The clauses disregard the wishes of
parents and thus violate the Federal and
State constitutional guarantees of religious
freedom. So far as I am aware, from the
point of view of civil law, there is complete
recognition of the rights of parents to determine the religion of a child. I doubt very
much whether any court or official would
feel it incumbent to commit a child to a
particular home against the expressed wish
of the parents. Of course, special questions

2) The religious protection clauses make
the State an instrumentality of the Church.

'Petition

of Gaily, 329 Mass. 143, 107 N.E. 2d
21, 25 (1952).
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are presented when parents are in conflict

with one another.
There have been few cases reported
construing these statutes in New York and

then only particular phases rather than the
basic issue raised by the secularists and
others. But in one case considered by the
Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court, the court in reversing the
decision below said:
On the facts presented herein, the legislative
mandate leaves no area for judicial discretion. It was and still is practicable to give
these infants to an institution under the
control of persons of their religious faith in
fulfillment of the statute that their "religious
faith shall be preserved and protected by
the Court" (N.Y.C. DOM. REL. CT. ACT,
§88, subd. 4). To this the children have a
natural and legal right of which they cannot be deprived by their temporary exposure
to the culture of another religion prior to the
age of reason. ' °

Conclusion
The object of this paper, has been to
present some considerations of importance
,o Matter of Santos, 278 App. Div. 373, 375, 105
N.Y.S. 2d 716, 718, reargumentand appeal denied,
279 App. Div. 578, 107 N.Y.S. 2d 543 (1st Dep't
1951), appeal dismissed, 304 N.Y. 483, 109 N.E.
2d 71 (1952).
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to the community, of particular importance
to religious welfare organizations, and, I
think, of special interest to lawyers and
future lawyers. One of the great problems
of the day is the balancing of freedom and
authority. Related is this question of the
relationships of the compulsory processes
of government with the many social and
religious organizations of a pluralist society.
My conviction is that neither the history
nor the theory of our laws justifies the
hostility to religion predicated by those supporting absolute separation. With Justice
Douglas in the Zorach case, I can
find no constitutional requirement which
makes it necessary for government to be
hostile to religion and to throw its weight
against efforts to widen the effective scope
of religious influence."
Certainly I am not urging any union of
Church and State in America; but I do believe and urge that the relations of Church
and State should be friendly, sympathetic
and cooperative in those matters of mutual
concern to both societies.
. Study and discussion, in and out of legal
circles, can make for a notable contribution
to the development of sound legal doctrine
in this matter of such current importance.
"Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 314 (1952).

[The statistics employed in the above article, based upon a survey of
the laws of forty-seven states, contain no reference to the Nevada Revised
Statutes which became available while this issue was being printed. The
Nevada statutes contain no religious provisions relating to adoption, but
do require that consideration be given to the religious factor whenever
practicable in the placement of children in family homes and private institutions. Ed.]

